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ABSTRACT 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) is currently considering 
best practice approaches to designing rules to prevent base erosion and profit shifting (‘BEPS’) by 
multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’). However, the OECD makes a distinction between combating 
BEPS and reducing distortions between the tax treatment of various methods of financing.
1
 Yet, an 
unequal tax treatment can create distortions, which incentivises tax planning behaviour. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to improve the tax design of anti-avoidance rules governing MNEs’ 
cross-border intercompany deductions by introducing the concept of the tax-induced cross-border 
funding bias. To date, the literature has focussed on the debt bias, which arises from the distortion in 
the tax treatment between debt and equity financing. On the other hand, the funding bias also includes 
licensing and leasing activities in addition to debt and equity financing. This presents a novel 
contribution to the literature. 
This paper examines the conceptual case for why is might be appropriate and feasible to restrict the 
tax deductibility of cross-border intercompany interest, dividends, royalties and lease payments given 
their mobility and fungibility. Specifically, it examines whether it is preferable for MNEs to be 
subject to economic rent taxation, as is attained through reform proposals such as the Allowance for 
Corporate Equity (‘ACE’), in this context. This presents a novel proposal for taxing cross-border 
intercompany economic rents which aligns with the main aim of corporate tax harmonisation; namely: 
to reduce, if not remove, distortions relating to the taxation of cross-border intercompany activities.  
                                                          
* BCom(Finance)/LLB(Hons) (UNSW), PhD (UNSW, in progress), School of Taxation and Business Law, UNSW Australia, Solicitor of 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales and High Court of Australia, a.kayis@unsw.edu.au. The author is deeply grateful to her PhD 
supervisors, Professor Neil Warren and Professor John Taylor, for their ongoing support and invaluable insights. This paper first appeared in 
Australian Tax Forum (2015) 30(3) 627–661 and is reprinted with kind permission of the Tax Institute. 
1 It is clear that both the OECD’s BEPS project and the thin capitalisation rules’ raisons d’être is primarily concerned with protecting 
national tax revenue bases, “In  discussing  fixed  ratio  rules  it  is  important  to  note  that  in  some  cases  these  tests  were  also 
introduced to play a wider tax policy role rather than with a focus on combating base erosion and profit shifting.  For  example,  a  number  
of  countries  introduced  such  rules  specifically  to  reduce  existing distortions between the tax treatment of debt and equity.”: OECD, 
‘BEPS Action 4: Interest deductions and other financial payments’ (Public Discussion Draft, 18 December 2014), 47. 
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1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
The advent of the global digital economy has heightened opportunities for aggressive tax planning by 
multinational enterprises (‘MNEs’) and has spurred harmful tax competition between governments. 
This has become a major concern in the academic and political debate on the future of international 
taxation, exemplified by the OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting (‘BEPS’) project, which aims to 
tax MNEs “where economic activities take place and value is created”.2 However, this raises 
politically charged issues associated with residence- and source-based taxation, most recently 
culminating in the UK’s implementation of a Diverted Profits Tax (‘DPT’), which Picciotto observes 
is largely indicative of a source-jurisdiction earmarking its claim over US-based MNEs’ earnings 
retained offshore.
3
 Similar reforms are currently underway in Australia, with plans to introduce a 
multinational anti-avoidance law to prevent MNEs from using artificial or contrived arrangements to 
avoid having a taxable presence in Australia.
4
 
Despite criticisms of aggressive tax planning behaviour by MNEs, the philosophical framework of 
neoliberal capitalism appears to justify this behaviour. The profit motive provides the justification for 
internalising benefits while externalising costs, which includes the minimisation of taxation. 
MNEs can shift expenses to, and income from, source countries to minimise tax payable with relative 
ease.
5
 This is exemplified in the context of cross-border intercompany transactions relating to passive 
or highly mobile income; specifically, interest, dividends, royalties and lease payments. The 
complexity and fungibility of these activities presents a particularly pressing issue for small, open 
economies such as Australia and New Zealand, which are net capital importers of capital. Further, this 
issue extends to all capital importers in general, rendering large capital importers such as the UK
6
 and 
Canada
7
 also within scope of the issue. 
An MNE’s ability to shift expenses or income may be constrained by transfer pricing and thin 
capitalisation rules, respectively. However, these rules are inadequate, internationally inconsistent, 
arbitrary and complex.
8
 Further, there is a marked absence of specific guidance on these rules at an 
international level.
9
 A further consideration that has attracted little attention in the international 
literature is that there is an absence of tax neutrality in the tax treatment of these different types of 
passive investment income. This absence of neutrality in the tax treatment of cross-border 
intercompany debt, equity, licensing and leasing expenses – otherwise known as cross-border intra-
group financing arrangements relating to passive or highly mobile income – is the focus of this paper. 
Grubert and Altshuler observe that “[i]t is hard to argue that the current system is based on any 
                                                          
2 OECD, Explanatory Statement: 2014 Deliverables, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (OECD Publishing, 2014), 7. 
3 “A strengthening of rules on controlled foreign corporations, which may result from another of the BEPS action plan points, would 
reinforce the tax claims of the MNC’s home jurisdiction while also acting as a disincentive to shifting profits from source countries. The 
DPT seems to be an assertion of a tax claim from the source country side, pre-empting residence country claims that might result from such 
stronger CFC rules. The intention may be not only to influence the BEPS process but also to pressure the U.S. Congress to reform the U.S. 
CFC rules in subpart F”: Picciotto S, ‘The U.K.’s Diverted Profits Tax: An Admission of Defeat or a Pre-Emptive Strike?’ [19 January 
2015] Tax Notes International 239, 242. 
4 At time of writing this reform was in the consultation phase, see further, Australian Government, Department of the Treasury, Tax 
Integrity: Multinational Anti-avoidance Law (12 May 2015), available at: 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/ConsultationsandReviews/Consultations/2015/Tax-Integrity-Law. 
5 “...the relative ease with which MNE groups can allocate capital to lowly taxed minimal functional entities (MFEs). This capital can then 
be invested in assets used within the MNE group, creating base eroding payments to these MFEs.”: see further, OECD, Public Discussion 
Draft, BEPS Action 8, 9 and 10: Discussion draft on revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (including risk, 
recharacterisation and special measures), 1 December 2014 – 6 February 2015, 38. For completeness, residence issues are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
6 Picciotto, above n 3. 
7 Inotai A, ‘Macroeconomic Impacts of the 2008–09 Crisis in Europe’, in: DeBardeleben J and Viju C, Economic Crisis in Europe: What it 
Means for the EU and Russia (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 21-46, 43. 
8 Rules are inadequate, internationally inconsistent, arbitrary and complex: “The present system raises little revenue, is complicated, creates 
incentives for aggressive income shifting, and interferes with companies’ efficient use of capital as they try to avoid the dividend 
repatriation tax”: Grubert H and Altshuler R, ‘Fixing the System: An Analysis of Alternative Proposals for the Reform of International Tax’ 
(2013) 66(3) National Tax Journal 671, 672. 
9 Further, the inadequacy of these regimes has been criticised by the OECD, observing that the “[current] rules provide opportunities to 
associate more profits with legal constructs and intangible rights and obligations, and to legally shift risk intra-group, with the result of 
reducing the share of profits associated with substantive operations”: OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: 
OECD Publishing, 2013), 5. 
3 
coherent concept of how an optimal system should be designed”.10 At present, MNEs are clearly at an 
advantage, with access to global debt and equity markets, various jurisdictions’ tax rates and various 
tax systems in general. These opportunities are nearly impossible to eliminate without full 
international tax coordination, which is nearly impossible in itself. So, governments and policymakers 
are increasingly faced with the competing objectives of remaining internationally competitive and 
encouraging foreign investment while also trying to maintain the integrity of their national tax bases. 
The “… spirit of tax coordination runs counter to that of tax competition”,11 presenting a conflict that 
is a legitimate struggle from a policy perspective. 
Section 2 begins by observing the growing academic consensus that the arm’s length principle is 
outmoded. This section examines the background, issues in practice and hurdles to reform associated 
with the arm’s length standard. In particular, this section highlights that the arm’s length principle as 
fundamentally flawed in design and highly complex in practice. This is supplemented by examining 
the literature which suggests that this standard considerably complicates the international tax system 
and can be exploited by MNEs to assist their tax planning activities, yet remains in practice due the 
political difficulties associated with changing international tax policy. 
Section 3 of this paper presents a two-fold extension of the literature, specifically: first, that all cross-
border intercompany financial, leasing and licensing activities are fungible and should therefore be 
treated equally for tax purposes; and second, that the framework utilised for this could be modelled on 
economic rent taxation. This section also merges these two concepts to present the possibility of 
implementing a combination of the ACE and Comprehensive Business Income Tax (‘CBIT’) 
(‘combined ACE-CBIT’) in the cross-border context as an alternative method of taxing cross-border 
intercompany activities. 
Finally, section 4 summarises the findings of this paper and includes areas for further research. 
 
2 IS THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD PRINCIPLED? 
2.1 PRACTICE 
Since the 1920s, through the League of Nations, then the United Nations and now the OCED, tax 
authorities have developed international principles for tax treaties in attempts to address the problem 
of international tax coordination. Their focus was traditionally centred on the question of avoiding 
international double taxation and has evolved into designing international principles to prevent both 
the double taxation and double non-taxation of MNE income, as noted by Sørensen:
12
 
“The issue of international tax coordination has often been seen mainly as a problem of 
alleviating double taxation. This problem arises because most countries insist on their right 
to tax all income originating within their borders as well as all income earned by their 
residents. However, since some countries have found it in their interest to play the role of 
"tax havens", the international tax coordination problem may often be one of preventing tax 
evasion rather than a problem of double taxation” 
The current international tax framework incentivises the location of expenses in higher-tax 
jurisdictions and income in low- or no-tax jurisdictions as it can result in significant tax minimisation. 
It is possible to achieve this by interposing subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions such as Ireland, The 
Netherlands or Singapore, and then utilise tax treaties to shift income onto tax havens such as 
Bermuda or the British Virgin Islands,
13
 where profits can be stored for years. This is further 
exacerbated by the plethora of jurisdictions for MNEs to choose from, many of which are engaged in 
a ‘race to the bottom’ on corporate income tax rates. Of course, broader-based corporate taxes with 
                                                          
10 Grubert and Altshuler, above n 8, 675. 
11 Musgrave PB, ‘Combining fiscal sovereignty and coordination: National taxation in a globalising world’, in: Kaul I and Conceicao P 
(eds.), The New Public Finance: Responding to Global Challenges (Oxford University Press, 2006), 175. 
12 Sørensen PB, ‘Issues in the Theory of International Tax Coordination’ (Bank of Finland Discussion Papers No 4/90, 20 February 1990), 
7-8.  
13 Somewhat relevantly, one of the British Virgin Islands is reputedly the model for Stevenson’s ‘Treasure Island’. 
4 
lower rates promote efficiency, investment and growth. However, if governments narrow their tax 
bases to attract the rerouting of flows of capital through, rather than to, their economy, then this 
quickly exits the realm of productive competition and enters the terrain of harmful tax competition. 
MNEs such as Apple, eBay, Google, Starbucks (to name a few) are reportedly engaging in practices 
similar to this in order to minimise their worldwide taxation.
14
  
In order to counter this behaviour, most advanced countries have implemented transfer pricing rules, 
thin capitalisation rules and withholding taxes as an important means of trying to defend source-based 
taxation. For completeness, thin capitalisation rules are limited in scope to debt financing
15
 and 
withholding taxes are vulnerable to bypassing techniques readily available to MNEs.
16
 Further, 
commentators such as Avi-Yonah are sceptical with regards to the future effectiveness of withholding 
taxes in developed countries.
17
 There is an extensive literature on these source-based taxes and the 
focus of this paper is on transfer pricing as it is most relevant to the issue of taxing intercompany 
activities. 
 
2.2 ISSUES IN PRACTICE – AND HURDLES TO REFORM 
Even though the cross-border issue cannot be isolated from the rest of the tax system,
18
 the focus of 
this paper is the cross-border setting because opportunities for tax planning are most prevalent in this 
context. MNEs are clearly at an advantage, with access to global debt and equity markets; various 
jurisdictions’ tax rates; and, various tax systems in general. In the absence of international tax 
coordination, these opportunities are nearly impossible to eliminate. The literature contains ample 
international empirical evidence that MNEs can, and do, shift their profits to countries with lower 
statutory tax rates and their expenses to countries with higher statutory tax rates.
19
 On the other hand, 
policymakers are increasingly faced with the competing objectives of remaining internationally 
competitive and encouraging foreign investment while also trying to maintain the integrity of their 
national tax bases. This ensures that profit-shifting and debt-shifting remain important constraints on 
tax policy in open economies.
20
 
The advent of capital mobility affords MNEs the advantage of earning cross-border investment 
income largely free from both host and home country taxation.
21
 Simultaneously, the ability of 
governments to tax said cross-border investment income is severely limited because actions taken 
unilaterally or bilaterally can be usurped given the interactions among country tax systems.
22
 
                                                          
14 See further: Australian Government, Senate Committee on Corporate Tax Avoidance: available at: 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Economics/Corporate_Tax_Avoidance/Submissions, which contains 70 
submissions from academics, practitioners, businesses and policymakers. 
15 Kayis-Kumar A, ‘Thin capitalisation rules: A second-best solution to the cross-border debt bias?’ (2015) 30(2) Australian Tax Forum 
(forthcoming). 
16 “… the withholding-bypassing techniques described about are based on the fact that the source country’s tax authorities are faced with 
partial information”: Herman D, Taxing Portfolio Income in Global Financial Markets (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: IBFD, 2002), 175. 
17 Avi-Yonah RS, ‘Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State’ (2000) 113(7) Harvard Law Review 1575-
1674; see also, Mintz JM and Weichenrieder AJ, The Indirect Side of Direct Investment: Multinational Company Finance and Taxation 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010), 47; “While dividend payments are typically subject to withholding taxes, interest payments 
and income derived from financial derivatives are typically exempt by double taxation treaties from withholding source taxes. This 
discontinuity is ridiculous given taxpayers' ability to replicate equity investments with the use of hybrid financial derivatives.”: Benshalom I, 
‘Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method’ (2009) 
28 Virginia Tax Review 619, 642. 
18 Grubert H and Altshuler R, ‘Corporate Taxes in the World Economy: Reforming the Taxation of Cross-Border Income’, in: Diamond J 
and Zodrow G (eds.) Fundamental Tax Reform: Issues, Choices, and Implications (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 319–321.  
19 de Mooij RA and Ederveen S, ‘Corporate tax elasticities: a reader's guide to empirical findings’ (2008) 24(4) Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 680-697; Altshuler R and Grubert H, ‘Governments and multinational corporations in the race to the bottom’ (2006) 41(5) Tax Notes 
International 459. 
20 Australian Government, Department of the Treasury, ‘Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer’, December 2009 (‘Henry 
Review’), Chapter B. 
21 Avi-Yonah RS, ‘Globalization and tax competition: implications for developing countries’ [August 2001] 74 CEPAL Review 59, 60-61; 
and references cited therein. 
22 “Policy prescriptions for any one country are hard to implement. Actions taken by one government alone could result in an inadvertent 
economic cost to the national economy – “shooting itself in its foot” – which is not very appealing”: Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 
141. 
5 
A multilateral solution is essential to preserving the fundamental goals of taxation.
23
 This is 
exemplified by BEPS Action 15, which consists of developing a multilateral instrument to modify 
bilateral tax treaties.
24
 Of course, in the absence of international tax coordination, full tax neutrality 
cannot be obtained, as tax rates and systems will still differ. Further, even if a multilateral solution is 
devised, in practice it is likely that revenue base protection concerns will be prioritised over the tax 
design principle of efficiency.
25
 
Nonetheless, from a tax point of view as a second-best solution, it is still possible to encourage 
neutrality between intercompany financing, licensing and leasing activities. This may be achieved by 
implementing fundamental reforms designed to equalise the tax treatment of cross-border 
intercompany financing, licensing and leasing activities. 
One of the key benefits of encouraging neutrality between these intercompany activities is that it will 
likely counteract the current conventions that allow manipulation of income categories. The literature 
contains a plethora of empirical evidence that MNEs use intercompany financial transactions to avoid 
taxes by engaging in tax planning strategies to, for example: render futile tax authorities’ transactional 
analysis attempting to trace and allocate financial income and expenses to specific corporate entities 
within MNEs;
26
  manipulate location decisions to minimize taxes;
27
 inflate foreign tax credits; and, 
engage in double-dip deductions.
28
 
Given that cross-border intercompany transactions account for more than 60% of global trade in terms 
of value,
29
 and remain largely absent from a group’s consolidated accounts (and therefore beyond 
public scrutiny), there is an urgent imperative to address these tax design issues. As observed by 
Benshalom: “Transfer pricing loopholes are of great concern given the growing impact of MNEs on 
the global economy, the integration of markets and sectors, and the increase in the volume and 
sophistication of cross-border affiliated transactions.” 30 
Unsurprisingly, the substantial media and political focus on transfer pricing issues has resulted in it 
being a major item on the agenda of the latest G-8 and G-20 meetings, and the third pillar of the 
OECD’s BEPS project. In the context of intercompany financing, the OECD is currently considering 
best practice approaches to designing rules to prevent BEPS using interest,
31
 which is pertinent since 
the literature is currently missing guidance at an international level on these rules.
32
 
Transfer pricing issues relating to intercompany transactions are largely governed by the international 
norm of the arm’s length principle,33 having been incorporated into most jurisdictions’ bilateral tax 
treaties through the OECD Model Tax Convention.
34
 However, the arm’s length tests have been the 
                                                          
23 Avi-Yonah, above n 21, 65; Picciotto S, ‘The International Crisis of Income Taxation: Combating tax havens, capital flight and 
corruption’ (Paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, Kent, UK, February 2007), 22. 
24 See further, OECD, BEPS Action 15: A Mandate for the Development of a Multilateral Insturment on Tax Treaty Measures to Tackle 
BEPS, 16 September 2014, available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-action-15-mandate-for-development-of-multilateral-instrument.pdf. 
25 Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 156-7. 
26 Benshalom, above n 17, 633-635. 
27 “There is significant empirical evidence that multinational groups manipulate intra-group debt, and the location of third-party debt, 
through interest deductions”: Burnett C, ‘Intra-Group Debt at the Crossroads: Stand-Alone versus Worldwide Approach’ (2014) 6(1) World 
Tax Journal 40, 45. 
28 These can arise from deductible charges for intercompany services including leasing and insurance expenses: Mintz and Weichenrieder, 
above n 17, 45. 
29 ICC Commission on Taxation and the ICC Committee on Customs and Trade Regulations, ‘Transfer pricing and customs value’ Policy 
Statement, Document No. 180/103-6-521, February 2012, 2. 
30 Benshalom, above n 17, 670. 
31 Both interest and financial payments economically equivalent to interest, and other expense incurred in connection with the raising of 
financing such as arrangement and guarantee fees are being targeted. The OECD is exploring the ‘fixed ratio’, ‘deemed interest’, ‘interest 
cap’ rules, the global group-wide test and a combined approach: OECD, above n 1. The global group-wide test appears one of the best suited 
options in this context. Criticism of this option mostly consists of speculation that this will tend to encourage groups to incur external debt 
which is not otherwise needed and which may further contribute to BEPS. 
32 Steeds P, ‘Transfer pricing considerations including guarantees’ (Conference paper presented at Second IBA/CIOT Conference, London: 
Holdon Bars, 12 February 2013. 
33 Eden L, Taxing Multinationals: Transfer Pricing and Corporate Income Taxation in North America (Toronto, Canada: University of 
Toronto Press, 1998), 32. 
34 See further, Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010_9789264175181-en;jsessionid=4naiu3f38brmg.x-oecd-live-02; 
see also: Commentary on Article 9, available at: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/2310111ec043.pdf?expires=1423358268&id=id&accname=ocid177499&checksum=7737E69983CEAB5D
C741337B0640FA48. For completeness, the OECD Model Tax Convention was elaborated on by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
6 
subject of much criticism in the academic literature.
35
 Interestingly, in the context of the BEPS 
project, OECD member states have excluded the arm’s length principle from being incorporated into a 
best practice recommendation on debt deductibility.
36
 Nonetheless, the arm’s length principle37 
remains within the scope of BEPS Actions 8–10.38 The OECD makes a distinction between combating 
BEPS and reducing distortions between the tax treatment of debt and equity.
39
 Yet, it is the decision 
of the revenue authorities to create a tax-induced debt bias which arguably results in said tax base 
erosion.
40
 Rather than merely addressing the ‘symptom’ of debt shifting via excessive interest 
deductions, it is arguably more effective to instead align the tax treatment of cross-border 
intercompany transactions to eliminate the tax incentive for said tax planning behaviour. 
There is a growing body of literature that criticises the arm’s length standard as an inadequate solution 
to the transfer pricing problem in the taxation of MNEs.
41
 MNEs unique ability to shift the location of 
assets, liabilities, profits and expenses by ‘paper transactions’ renders the location of MNEs’ 
production ambiguous and, at times, unobservable. This impairs the accuracy of the allocation of 
output and income across countries and geographic regions,
42
 and is in stark contrast to observable 
market transactions which formed the conceptual basis for the arm’s length principle. 
This divergence may cause confusion on a theoretical level, and is even more problematic on a 
practical level when policymakers implement and attempt to administrate the concept. 
 
2.2.1 Arm’s length is ‘a fundamentally flawed fiction’ 
The international norm of the arm’s length principle enables intercompany transfer prices to be set as 
if related parties were transacting as unrelated parties in a competitive environment.
43
 However, this 
contradicts the modern theory of the firm, which posits that intercompany transactions differ 
significantly from market transactions
44
 and that the “raison d’être of multinational firms is that the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts”.45 Since an MNE would likely prefer to use intercompany 
transactions when the transaction costs of market transactions are relatively higher, this presents a 
fundamental flaw in the arm’s length principle. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations published in 1995 and 2010, available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-
pricing/transfer-pricing-guidelines.htm. 
35 “Nonetheless, there is universal agreement that this standard leaves substantial room for tax incentives to affect pricing, as arm’s length 
prices are often difficult to establish … [and] has become administratively unworkable in its complexity … [it] rarely provides useful 
guidance regarding economic value.”: Avi-Yonah RS and Clausing KA, ‘A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment for Corporate 
Income Taxation’, (Law & Economics Working Paper Art 70, University of Michigan Law School, 2007). 
36 “Countries engaged in this work agreed that fixed ratio rules, group-wide rules and targeted rules should all be given further 
consideration … neither arm’s length tests nor withholding taxes should be included as options for a best practice recommendation”: 
OECD, above n 1, 12-14. For completeness, withholding taxes are beyond the scope of this paper, as are CFC rules. 
37 For completeness, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines considered the global formulary apportionment proposal as a possible 
alternative to the arm’s length approach. However this was rejected by both OECD member countries and non-member countries, and is 
beyond the scope of this paper. See further “…OECD member countries reiterate their support for the consensus on the use of the arm's 
length principle that has emerged over the years among member and non-member countries and agree that the theoretical alternative to the 
arm's length principle represented by global formulary apportionment should be rejected”: OECD, ‘Review of Comparability and of Profit 
Methods: Revision Of Chapters I-III of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines’, 22 July 2010, 10. 
38 “As the BEPS Action Plan indicates, the main aim of the Transfer Pricing Actions (8-10) is to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in 
line with value creation. The BEPS Action Plan also indicates that in order to achieve this aim ‘special measures, either within or beyond 
the arm’s length principle, may be required with regard to intangible assets, risk and over-capitalisation’.”: OECD, above n 5, 2. 
39 It is clear that both the OECD’s BEPS project and the thin capitalisation rules’ raisons d’être is primarily concerned with protecting 
national tax revenue bases: OECD, above n 1, 47. 
40 Hanlon D, ‘Thin Capitalisation Legislation and the Australia/United States Double Tax Convention: Can They Work Together?’ (2000) 
3(1) Journal of Australian Taxation 4. 
41 See, for example: Rectenwald G, ‘A Proposed Framework For Resolving The Transfer Pricing Problem: Allocating The Tax Base Of 
Multi-national Entities Based On Real Economic Indicators Of Benefit And Burden’ (2102) 23 Duke Journal Of Comparative & 
International Law 425, 427-428. 
42 Kozlow R, ‘Multinational enterprises, foreign direct investment and related income flows’, Chapter 3, in: UNECE, The Impact Of 
Globalization On National Accounts, (New York and Geneva: UN, 2011) 15-16 and references cited therein. 
43 Raboy DG and Wiggins SN, ‘Intangible capital, hedonic pricing, and international transfer prices’ (1997) 25(4) Public Finance Review 
347, 348, and references cited therein at footnote 1. 
44 “This logic lies at the heart of Coase (1937) and is central to the remaining modern work on the theory of the firm”: Raboy and Wiggins, 
above n 43, 348, and references cited therein at footnote 2. 
45 Bird RM and Brean DJS, ‘The interjurisdictional allocation of income and the unitary taxation debate’ (1986) 34(6) Canadian Tax 
Journal 1377, 1388. 
7 
Avi-Yonah observes that:
46
 
“… multinational groups of companies arise precisely in order to avoid the inefficiencies that 
arise when unrelated companies must transact with one another at arm’s length … the 
problems with the current system derive not from rules at its periphery, but instead from a 
fallacy that lies at the system's central core: namely, the belief that transactions among 
unrelated parties can be found that are sufficiently comparable to transactions among 
members of multinational groups that they can be used as meaningful benchmarks for tax 
compliance and enforcement”.  
There is resounding academic support for this proposition, with commentators such as Rectenwald, 
Benshalom, Schön and Morse describing the arm’s length principle, particularly in the context of 
intercompany transactions, as: “hopelessly outmoded and broken”;47 “ … subject to widespread abuse 
using transfer pricing”;48 “theoretically bankrupt”;49 “a sad fiction rather than a fundamental 
guidepost … lack the principled underpinning”; 50 “commercial rationality’ within a firm is clearly 
not what the arm’s-length standard is about”;51 “systematically disconnected”;52 “simply does not 
exist in any unrelated ‘comparable’”;53 “a fallacy”;54 and, “broken beyond repair … the arm's length 
standard is so inept at dealing with these transactions”.55 
However, this idea that arm’s length pricing is not consistent with the commercial realities of MNEs 
intercompany transactions is not a recent finding.
56
 The seminal work of both Schmalenbach
57
 and 
Hirshleifer
58
 over a century ago and over fifty years ago, respectively, showed that the starting point 
for intercompany optimal transfer pricing should be the ‘marginal cost’ not the ‘market price’.59 
This assessment in both the German literature and the Anglo literature is part of the business, rather 
than economic or tax, literature. Even though transfer pricing issues are subject to intensive 
controversies within these disciplines,
60
 this scepticism extends beyond the academic realm into 
industry. This is exemplified by both national
61
 and international
62
 accounting standards approaching 
arm’s length pricing in the intercompany context with scepticism. 
 
                                                          
46 Avi-Yonah RS, Clausing KA and Durst MC, ‘Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split’ 
(2009) 9(5) Florida Tax Review 497, 503. 
47 Rectenwald, above n 41, 449. 
48 Rectenwald, above n 41, 446: see also; Benshalom, above n 17.  
49 Benshalom I, ‘Sourcing the “Unsourceable”: The Cost Sharing Regulations and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related 
Transactions’ (2007) 26 Virginia Tax Review 631, 641–45: noting  the  “theoretical  deficiency”  and  “enforcement deficiency” of the arm’s 
length standard; see also: Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, above n 46, 500; Vann RJ, ‘Taxing International Business Income: Hard-Boiled 
Wonderland and the End of the World’ (2010) 2(3) World Tax Journal 291. 
50 Morse SC, ‘The Transfer Pricing Regs Need a Good Edit’ (2013) 40 Pepperdine Law Review 1415, 1427–1428. 
51 Schön W, ‘Transfer Pricing, the Arm’s Length Standard and European Union Law’, in: Richelle I, Schön W and Traversa E (eds.) 
Allocating Taxing Powers Within the European Union (2013). 
52 Schön, above n 51, and references cited therein at footnotes 89–91. 
53 Morse, above n 50, 1421 and references cited therein at footnote 34. 
54 Morse, above n 50, 1422; see also, describing “the fruitless search for source”: Kleinbard ED, ‘Stateless Income’s Challenge to Tax 
Policy, Part 2’ (2012) [November] Tax Notes International 671, 750–52. 
55 Benshalom, above n 17, 628-629. 
56 Schön, above n 51, and references cited therein at footnotes 89–91. 
57 The original text is in the oldest and most prestigious German business journal: Schmalenbach E, ‘Über Verrechnungspreise’ (1908/09) 3 
Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 165-185. 
58  “If the market is imperfectly competitive, or where no market for the transferred commodity exists, the correct procedure is to transfer at 
marginal cost (given certain simplifying conditions) or at some price between marginal cost and market price in the most general case”: 
Hirshleifer J, ‘On the Economics of Transfer Pricing’ (1956) Journal of Business 172-184. 
59  Schön, above n 51, and references cited therein at footnotes 89–91. 
60 Schön W, ‘Transfer Pricing – Business Incentives, International Taxation and Corporate Law’ (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and 
Public Finance, Working Paper 2011 – 05, January 2011), 3. 
61 “Disclosures that related party transactions were made on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm’s length transactions are made 
only if such terms can be substantiated.”: Australian Government, Australian Accounting Standards Board, AASB 124: Related Party 
Disclosures (December 2009), 18; available at: http://www.aasb.gov.au/admin/file/content105/c9/AASB124_12-09.pdf. 
62 “Transactions involving related parties cannot be presumed to be carried out on an arm's-length basis, as the requisite conditions of 
competitive, free-market dealings may not exist. Representations about transactions with related parties, if made, shall not imply that the 
related party transactions were consummated on terms equivalent to those that prevail in arm's-length transactions unless such 
representations can be substantiated.”: Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial Accounting Foundation, Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards No. 57: Related Party Disclosures (March 1982), 5; available at: 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220127001&acceptedDisclaimer=true. 
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2.2.2 Arm’s length is ‘absurdly complex’ and ineffective 
The absence of an active market for intercompany transactions necessitates implementing a complex 
regulatory framework with burdensome compliance requirements, which has resulted in a lack of 
administrability. 
Commentators such as Avi-Yonah, Taylor, and Altshuler and Ackerman observe that: “the current 
system is absurdly complex”;63 “a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity”;64 and, “deeply, 
deeply flawed … it is difficult to overstate the crisis in the administration of the international tax 
system”.65 This is exacerbated by the fact that arm’s length pricing may not even be a suitable 
approach to dealing with BEPS; Vann and Burnett have observed that arm’s length tests “can be 
resource intensive and time consuming for both taxpayers and tax authorities, [which] can lead to 
uncertainty and may be ineffective in preventing BEPS in any event”.66 Rather, the current network of 
transfer pricing rules has spawned a substantial tax planning industry consisting of lawyers, 
accountants and economists who specialise in MNE transfer pricing planning and compliance.
67
 This 
is symptomatic of the absence of a theoretically sound, principled underpinning for these rules. 
 
2.2.3 Arm’s length and the political dynamics of international policy 
Nonetheless, international organisations, governments and policymakers including the OECD, the 
European Union, the United Nations and the US Treasury support arm’s length pricing as “an 
appropriate benchmark for the assignment of income and deduction items to different affiliates in a 
MNE”.68 It is also noteworthy that any attempts to replace the arm’s length principle with a more 
transparent system would likely be prone to substantial resistance from the few large MNEs capable 
of benefiting most from the existing system. This political asymmetry is difficult to overcome because 
“the corporate taxpayers with the greatest pull over tax policy are preoccupied by a culture of tax 
avoidance”.69 
 
2.2.4 Arm’s length and the law ‘beyond discrimination’ 
The literature also raises the issue that if cross-border intercompany transactions were treated 
distinctly this would constitute a discriminatory obstacle, or restriction, to the freedom of 
establishment principle, as codified in both EU law and the OECD Model Tax Convention and as 
applied by the ECJ.
70
 
While this may appear to be an insurmountable hurdle, Schön makes the observation that deliberate 
attempts by MNEs to engage in base erosion by manipulating so-called ‘arm’s length’ pricing can be 
countered by domestic anti-avoidance legislation.
71
 Accordingly, it may be possible to extend this 
                                                          
63 Avi-Yonah and Clausing, above n 35. 
64 Taylor W, ‘Testimony before the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, March 31, 2005’ Tax Notes (4 April 2005), Doc 
2005-6654. 
65 Altshuler R and Ackerman J, ‘International Aspects of Recommendations from the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform’ 
(International Tax Policy Forum Presentation, 2 December 2005). 
66 Vann R and Burnett C, ‘Re: BEPS Action 4 Discussion Draft dated 18 December 2014’ (Comment received on Public Discussion Draft, 
BEPS Action 4: Interest deductions and other financial payments, 6 February 2015), 234. 
67 Avi-Yonah and Clausing, above n 35, 9. 
68 Morse, above n 50, 1421: see further, “[T]he view of OECD Member countries continues to be that the arm’s length principle should 
govern the evaluation of transfer prices among associated enterprises … The arm's length principle is sound in theory … [it] reflects the 
economic realities of the controlled taxpayer's particular facts and circumstances and adopts as a benchmark the normal operation of the 
market.”: OECD, ‘The Arm's Length Principle’, in: OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations 2009 (OECD Publishing), 29; “In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied 
in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.”: US Treasury Regulation § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2012); 
see further: Schön, above n 51, 77: citing Case C-311/08, Société de Gestion Industrielle SA v. Belgium, 2010 E.C.R. I-00487, decided by 
the European Court of Justice, which referenced the arm’s length standard as an appropriate tool to combat “abusive arrangements”: United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries, at 15–16 and 66–67. 
69 Rectenwald, above n 41, 449; see also references cited therein. 
70  Société de Gestion Industrielle v Belgian State (Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Third Chamber)) [21 January 2010], Case C‐
311/08, 56-75; Schön, above n 51. 
71 In 2013, Australia attempted to address this by introducing the Tax Laws Amendment (Countering Tax Avoidance and Multinational Profit 
Shifting) Bill 2013 (Cth), which amended the general anti-avoidance rule  in Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and 
9 
doctrine ‘beyond discrimination’72 such that there is justification for applying transfer pricing controls 
solely to cross-border intercompany transactions.  
 
3 ARE CROSS-BORDER INTERCOMPANY FINANCIAL FLOWS FUNGIBLE? 
3.1 ASCERTAINING FUNGIBILITY 
Complementing the formidable research on the debt bias
73
 is a growing body of academic literature 
examining the fungibility of debt and equity financing in the context of MNEs, led by commentators 
including Burnett,
74
 Mintz and Weichenreider,
75
 Graetz,
76
 and Benshalom,
77
 among others.
78
 The 
literature is clear with regards to the fungibility and mobility of intercompany debt and its 
substitutability with equity. 
However, considerably less attention has been directed towards the broader concept of the fungibility 
of intercompany financing, licensing and leasing activities. Many commentators either omit or carve-
out these other forms of intercompany financial flows from the scope of their research. For example, 
Benshalom recognises the mobility and fungibility of intercompany financial transactions, yet 
proposes of formulary allocation applied only to income derived from transactions that are composed 
of financial assets“…representing pecuniary assets (e.g., loans), equity holdings, assets whose value 
is a derivative of financial indices (e.g., foreign exchange swap transactions), and, with few 
exceptions, all assets that could be traded in financial markets (e.g., stock, bonds, future contracts, 
options)”.79 Accordingly, both intercompany licensing and leasing activities are omitted from the 
scope of Benshalom’s formulary allocation proposal, signalling a gap in the literature. 
It goes without saying that both MNEs and independent firms have a plethora of options available for 
the cross-border flow of funds, as shown in Figure 1 below. However, this paper is limited to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
introduced new transfer pricing provisions into Division 815 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cth). For completeness, the Board of 
Taxation more recently released a number of reports dealing with the debt and equity tax rules, the thin capitalisation arm’s length debt test 
and tax arrangements applying to permanent establishments, among others: see further, Australian Government, The Board of Taxation, 
Better Tax – A National Conversation about Tax Reform (4 June 2015), available at: 
http://www.taxboard.gov.au/content/Content.aspx?doc=current_activities/default.htm.  
72 Schön, above n 51. 
73 See, for example, De Mooij RA, ‘Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions’ (IMF Staff Discussion Note 
SDN/11/11, 3 May 2011); IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, ‘Debt Bias and Other Distortions: Crisis-related Issues in Tax Policy’ 
(International Monetary Fund Study, 12 June 2009); Blessing PH, ‘The Debt-Equity Conundrum – A Prequel’ (2012) 66(4-5) Bulletin for 
International Taxation 198. 
74 Burnett, above n 27, 44, 63 and 67. 
75 “… we focus on debt financial structuring by multinationals although some of the analysis we provide could be easily applied to leasing 
and insurance structuring”: Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 13. 
76 “… the treatment of cross-border interest payments is now one of the most complex aspects of income tax law. Rules differ among 
countries and contexts … because money is fungible, it is difficult in both theory and practice to know the ‘purpose’ of specific borrowing. 
Nevertheless, many countries attempt to ‘trace’ borrowed funds to their use, creating opportunities for creative tax planning and inducing 
inevitable disputes between taxpayers and tax collectors”: Graetz MJ, ‘A Multilateral Solution for the Income Tax Treatment of Interest 
Expenses’ [November 2008] Bulletin for International Taxation 486, 487. 
77 “The most startling example is withholding taxes on financial payments. While dividend payments are typically subject to withholding 
taxes, interest payments and income derived from financial derivatives are typically exempt by double taxation treaties from withholding 
source taxes. This discontinuity is ridiculous given taxpayers' ability to replicate equity investments with the use of hybrid financial 
derivatives”: Benshalom, above n 17, 642; Benshalom I, ‘The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an 
Allocation Phase’ (2008) 28 Virginia Tax Review 165; Benshalom I, ‘Rethinking the Source of the Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing Problem’ 
(2013) 32(3) Virginia Tax Review 425. 
78 “The task of objectively determining a particular branch’s equity capital is significant since money is fungible and both equity capital and 
debt capital may be moved between different parts of an international bank with ease”: Kobetsky M, International Taxation of Permanent 
Establishments: Principles and Policy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 265-266; Rosenbloom HD, ‘Banes of an 
Income Tax: Legal Fictions, Elections, Hypothetical Determinations, Related Party Debt’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 17; see further, 
beyond the tax law literature: “Because the roles of debt, equity, and hybrid debt-equity instruments in the capital structure of the firm are to 
a significant extent interchangeable…a formal legal distinction between debt and equity in insider trading law does not make sense”: 
Strudler and Orts, ‘Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading’ (1999) 78 Texas Law Review 375-438, 392-393; see also, Huang H, 
International Securities Markets: Insider Trading Law in China (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2006), 155. 
79 Benshalom, above n 17, 641. 
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examining cross-border activities from the MNE perspective because MNEs are uniquely advantaged 
by having greater control over the mode and timing of these activities.
80
 
Figure 1 
 
 
From the perspective of MNEs, intercompany financing, licensing and leasing activities are 
profoundly influenced by taxation.
81
 This subset of financial activities is described as “Financial 
Flows” in Figure 1 above. While this Figure 1 appears to omit leasing from its scope, the author 
considers that, given the literature on financing leases,
82
 it would be suitable to categorise 
intercompany leasing within “Financial Flows”. This fungibility of cross-border intercompany 
transactions, and their capacity to erode the tax base of source jurisdictions, is illustrated in Figure 2, 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 below.  
                                                          
80 Shapiro AC and Balbirer SD, Modern Corporate Finance: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Value Creation (Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999), Topic F4 ‘The Multinational Financial System’; available at: 
http://www.prenhall.com/divisions/bp/app/finflash/html/onlinehtml/topicf/topicf4.html. 
81 In addition to capital gains taxes, personal income taxes and non-resident withholding taxes: Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 18. 
82 “Multinationals can effectively shift income across jurisdictions through leasing arrangements since all debt and imputed equity financing 
expenses are included in the lease costs”: Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 13.  
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Figure 2 
 
Figure 2 above illustrates the impact of three options with an intercompany scenario. First, where 
there are no intercompany financing activities the overall tax payable is $70. However, once Co. A
83
 
provides $1000 in equity to Co. B,
 84
 which then funnels those funds through to Co. C
85
 in the form of 
an intercompany loan, then the overall tax payable is reduced to $52.5. A third option is to have Co. B 
separately extend an intercompany loan to Co. A, which will reduce the taxable income in that 
jurisdiction and result in an overall tax payable for the MNE at $25. This is almost a third of the 
original tax liability. Despite the possibility of foreign tax credits and withholding taxes being 
applicable in this context for all of these scenarios in this paper, this additional layer is beyond the 
scope of this paper and will instead be the subject for further research by the author. However, it is 
important to briefly note that, in practice, capital exporters can (and do) reduce the foreign tax on their 
capital exports by choosing a lower rate of credit for foreign taxes. The US foreign tax credit rules are 
unfortunately exemplary in this regard, placing significant restrictions on the ability of US parent 
companies to realise tax credits for the taxes paid by their foreign subsidiaries.
86
 Sørensen observes 
that in this way “capital exporters can use their credit rates as a retaliatory weapon against capital 
importers”.87 This is a particularly pressing issue for small, open economies such as Australia and 
New Zealand, which are net capital importers of capital. Further, this issue extends to all capital 
importers in general, rendering large capital importers such as Canada and the United Kingdom also 
within scope.
88
 
Separately, further tax minimisation may be possible by the Parent (Co. A) obtaining a loan from a 
financial institution, or if a group member grants a loan to the Parent through a conversion of equity to 
debt financing or the creation of intra-group debt. This is shown in as the third option within this 
scenario with the inclusion of the loan between Co. A and Co. B, whereby new interest is deducted 
twice (in both the US and Australia) while interest income is taxed in Ireland, a low-tax jurisdiction. 
For completeness, any jurisdiction with relatively low taxes is a contender for the interposed entity 
scenario illustrated in this paper. In the Australian context, it appears that Singapore is a relatively 
more popular jurisdiction than Ireland in terms of the volume of intercompany payments made by 
Australian companies.
89
 
                                                          
83 Co. A is the parent and is a tax resident of the US where the corporate income tax rate is 40%. 
84 Co. B is a subsidiary and is a tax resident of Ireland where the corporate income tax rate is 12.5%. 
85 Co. A is also a subsidiary and is a tax resident of Australia where the corporate income tax rate is 30%. 
86 PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Global Tax Guide (John Wiley & Sons, 2006), 14. 
87 Sørensen, 50, http://www.suomenpankki.fi/pdf/SP_DP_1990_04.pdf.  
88 Inotai, above n 7, 43. 
89 Butler B and Wilkins G, ‘Singapore, Ireland top havens for multinational tax dodgers’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 1 May 2014; 
available at: http://www.smh.com.au/business/singapore-ireland-top-havens-for-multinational-tax-dodgers-20140430-37hzi.html. 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the fungibility of financing and licensing by showing how the exact same result 
can be arrived at through Co. C paying Co. B royalties instead of interest. Separately, it is important 
to note the possibility of extending additional sub-licenses to other subsidiaries to minimise tax. This 
example excludes tax deductions that may also be available for the acquisition or creation of 
intellectual property, for example, research and development concessions, general deductions, 
uniform capital allowances and capital gains tax treatment. 
 
Figure 4 
 
This third type of cross-border intercompany activity shows the tax base eroding impact of both 
double-dipping depreciation expenses and claiming lease payment expenses. The original option of 
Co. C purchasing an asset would have resulted in an overall tax payable of $40,
90
 as Co. A would 
                                                          
90 Co. A would have originally been taxed on its $100 EBIT and Co. C had its taxable income reduced to 0 after deducting the $100 
depreciation expense from its $100 EBIT. 
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have originally been taxed on its $100 earnings before interest and taxes (‘EBIT’) and Co. C had its 
taxable income reduced to 0 after deducting the $100 depreciation expense from its $100 EBIT. 
However, by arranging for the purchase through the Parent and a sub-lease via Co. B, the result has 
been to reduce overall tax payable to $0. It is possible to ‘double-dip’ due to varying tax laws 
regarding depreciation allowances exist across jurisdictions (some countries apply legal ownership 
tests while others apply economic ownership tests – Irish rules have a reputation for being a ‘good fit’ 
with other jurisdictions’ rules, rending the possibility of even a ‘triple-dip’). Further, Mintz and 
Weichenrieder observe that MNEs can “…effectively shift income across jurisdictions through leasing 
arrangements since all debt and imputed equity financing expenses are included in the lease costs”.91 
Leases can also be used to avoid customs duties, achieve a lower cost of borrowing with no minimum 
equity balance on investment and can also be used to achieve off-balance sheet financing. For 
completeness, the “Royalty and Interest Directive” which impacts equipment leasing has been 
excluded. If a double-dip is not available, it would be possible to lower the Parent’s taxable income 
through an intercompany loan from its subsidiary, Co. B. 
At a theoretical level, Benshalom provides the most relevant analysis on the fungibility of these 
activities, observing that “almost every type of tax reduction plan that uses affiliated financial 
transactions could be executed via other types of affiliated transactions”.92 The fungibility and 
mobility of these intercompany financial flows means that attempts to allocate ownership to any one 
entity within an MNE is an arbitrary exercise.
93
 However, Benshalom’s research is limited to 
separately and distinctly analysing the taxation of intercompany financing
94
 and licensing, briefly 
mentioning leasing activities but distinguishing them as separate from financing transactions,
95
 despite 
acknowledging that “it is impossible to draw a perfect line between financial transactions and non-
financial transactions … affiliated leasing transactions could replicate the consequences of related 
lending”.96  Nonetheless, Benshalom observes that the mobility of intercompany activities erodes the 
source jurisdiction’s tax base from both the perspective of intangible and tangible manufacturing and 
merchandise activities.
97
 So, while the literature implicitly contains support for the proposition that 
cross-border intercompany financing, licensing and leasing activities are fungible, there is very little 
literature that directly studies the taxation implications of this observation. 
At a practical level, evidence in support of the proposition that cross-border intercompany financing, 
licensing and leasing activities are fungible is contained in both some existing regulations and the 
academic literature. Regarding legislation, US Treasury Regulation §1.882-5 views interest as 
fungible, using a formula to determine the attributable interest expense.
98
 An extract of this regulation 
is as follows:
99
  
“The term financing transaction also includes any other advance of money or property 
pursuant to which the transferee is obligated to repay or return a substantial portion of the 
money or other property advanced or the equivalent in value.”  
This is considered a valuable step in equalising the playing field between MNEs and tax authorities. 
On one hand, MNEs are largely indifferent to the structuring of their internal financial flows because 
these are fungible and mobile with no substantial economic cost. In contrast, tax authorities generally 
do not have adequate resources to audit the increasing volumes of intercompany activities. 
                                                          
91 Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 13. 
92 Benshalom, above n 77, 193-195; see also: Benshalom, above n 49. 
93 Benshalom, above n 49, 660-661. 
94 Benshalom, above n 77, 193-195; see also: Benshalom, above n 49, 647. 
95 Benshalom, above n 49, 647. 
96 Benshalom, above n 17, 642. 
97 Benshalom, above n 49, 647. 
98 Ring DM, ’Risk-Shifting Within a Multinational Corporation: The Incoherence of the U.S. Tax Regime’ (1997) 4(4) Boston College Law 
Review 667, 712. 
99 On August 10, 1993, US Congress enacted section 7701(1) of the Internal Revenue Code; Section 1.881-3(a)(2) of the final regulations 
provides definitions of certain terms used throughout the regulations. A financing arrangement is defined as a series of transactions by which 
one person (the financing entity) advances money or other property, or grants rights to use property, and another person (the financed entity) 
receives money or other property, or the right to use property, if the advance and receipt are effected through one or more other persons 
(intermediate entities) and there are financing transactions linking the financing entity, each of the intermediate entities, and the financed 
entity; see further: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-regs/td8611.txt. 
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Administrative complexity is further exacerbated by the arm’s length standard requirement of finding 
the proper market comparables of specifically tailored financial flows.
100
  
In this context, by disallowing tax deductions in relation to all intercompany financing activities, 
Benshalom’s proposal is “motivated by a desire for administrative convenience at the expense of 
economic accuracy”101 and aims to incapacitate the ability of MNEs from using the most mobile class 
of intercompany assets to attain tax planning objectives.
102
  While this proposal does not 
underperform the existing international tax system,
103
 it is questionable that it would be a politically 
viable option, given the discussion in section 2.2 regarding reform hurdles in the context of MNEs.  
Accordingly, this paper establishes the scaffolding for further research by the author to extend the 
existing literature by examining the viability of allowing a partial deduction for the cost of 
intercompany financing, licensing and leasing activities on the basis that they are economic 
equivalents.  
This is a particularly pressing issue to address given the “effective end of withholding tax in developed 
countries”,104 as described by Avi-Yonah. As mentioned in section 2.1 above, even though levying 
withholding taxes on non-residents was originally designed to protect source jurisdictions from tax 
base erosion via cross-border deductible expenses such as interest, lease payments, royalties, this is 
arguably no longer the case. Accordingly, it is important to explore a ‘middle ground’ between 
Benshalom’s proposal and the existing system that mitigates issues that exist within both of these 
options, while also anticipating issues associated with ‘plugging one hole while leaving exposed 
another hole’. 
Alternative reforms have been proposed that aim to address existing concerns in this context, in 
particular, with the arm’s length standard. While there exists an extensive literature canvassing these 
proposed reforms, a thorough analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. For completeness, the reform 
options range from implementing modifications to the arm’s length standards by applying more rigid 
arm’s length tests105 with, for example, an imputed interest rate;106 applying a combination of the 
arm’s length standard and formulary methods;107 to moving towards worldwide taxation through 
consolidation
108
 and formulary apportionment.
109
  Most relevantly, Rectenwald suggests a novel 
implementation of formulary apportionment based on applying different formulas tailored to different 
categories of income;
110
 specifically, intercompany transactions, such as financial transactions, which 
                                                          
100 Benshalom, above n 77, 193-195; see also: Benshalom, above n 49. 
101 Benshalom, above n 17, 642. 
102 See further: Brabazon ML, ‘The Attribution Of Profits and Capital Structure To A Permanent Establishment Under The OECD Model 
Tax Treaty’ (2003) 18 Australian Tax Forum 347, 358-361. 
103 Benshalom, above n 17, 642. 
104 Avi-Yonah, above n 17. Relevantly, the Henry Review criticised Australia’s current treatment of foreign debt as complex and 
distortionary, recommending a reduction in the interest withholding tax rate to zero among tax treaty partners. With an effective interest 
withholding tax rate of 3.5%, liability for withholding tax would likely not outweigh the advantages of interest deductibility given 
comparative levels of corporate tax. While the literature has recognised the debt bias as prevalent in the foreign debt context, policy makers 
have called for the reduction of interest withholding tax to 0% provided appropriate safeguards exist to limit tax avoidance: 
“Recommendation 34: Consideration should be given to negotiating, in future tax treaties or amendments to treaties, a reduction in interest 
withholding tax to zero so long as there are appropriate safeguards to limit tax avoidance”; Henry K, Harmer J, Piggott J, Ridout H and 
Smith G, Australia’s Future Tax System: Report to the Treasurer, Commonwealth of Australia, December 2009, Part 2, Chapter B1–4, 
available at: http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/content/FinalReport.aspx?doc=html/publications/Papers/Final_Report_Part_2/chapter_b1-
4.htm. 
105 Morse focussed on planning under the transfer pricing regulation, with an extensive summary of the literature and proposing a 
modification to the transfer pricing regulations to enable them to “operate more like rules and less like standards” as an alternative to a 
more fundamental reform of these rules: Morse, above n 50.  
106 Benshalom proposes “maintaining the arm’s-length standard but applying it more rigidly—that is, to re-characterize intra-group equity 
investments as long-term subordinated debt (with imputed interest rates)”: Benshalom, above n 77. 
107 Benshalom, above n 17, 630. 
108 “An alternative approach to cutting statutory tax rates to combat income shifting through financial decisions is to move to worldwide 
taxation whereby resident multinationals would be fully taxed on their foreign source income with a credit (or deduction) given for foreign 
corporate income and withholding taxes (Alworth 1988, Grubert and Altshuler 2006). At the same time, deferral of residence-based taxes to 
the time when foreign income is repatriated would be ended. Effectively, this would extend the current tax treatment of branches and passive 
income, as it is applied in many countries, to all sources of income, including that earned by subsidiaries. It would require rules for 
consolidation of income on an international basis, thereby requiring threshold rules to determine membership in the corporate group.”: 
Mintz and Weichenrieder, above n 17, 160; see also, Graetz, above n 76, 492. 
109 Avi-Yonah et al propose a formula-based profit split system of apportionment: Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, above n 46, 506–525. 
110 Rectenwald, above n 41, 427-428. 
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he observes “the current transfer pricing system especially fails to account for accurately”.111 
 
3.2 THE RELEVANCE OF ECONOMIC RENTS 
Devereux presents a highly comprehensive and concise literature review in the context of the taxation 
of economic rents from the perspective of a small, capital-importing economy.
112
 This review suggests 
there is little emphasis in the literature regarding the taxation of economic rent in the small, open 
economy context.
113
  
Taxing only economic rents has long been advocated by economists
114
 on the basis that, at least in 
principle, decisions at the margin are not affected by tax since the marginal investment is not taxed.
115
 
This is particularly important in the context of a small, open economy where the marginal investor is 
likely to be a foreign investor.
116
 
Given their fungibility and the issues associated with the arm’s length principle, this section examines 
the conceptual basis for an alternative method of taxing intercompany financing, licensing and leasing 
activities on their above-normal rents by reference to an imputed allowance for the cost of these 
activities. 
The starting point for this analysis is the seminal work of Hirshleifer, who observed that:
117
  
“If the market is imperfectly competitive, or where no market for the transferred commodity 
exists, the correct procedure is to transfer at marginal cost (given certain simplifying 
conditions) or at some price between marginal cost and market price in the most general 
case”. 
Relevantly, there is an extensive literature suggesting that MNEs typically exist in order to earn 
economic rents,
118
 and that they bear no substantial economic costs of structuring their internal 
financial flows one way or the other.
119
  So, from an economic efficiency perspective it is preferable 
for MNEs to be subject to economic rent taxation
120
 because economic rent taxes are neutral and 
thereby minimise distortions.
121
 
The key criticism in the literature that is associated with taxing mobile rents through source-based 
taxation is that this may reduce investment
122
 by simply shifting the investment to a lower tax 
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jurisdiction in order to receive a greater share of the rents.
123
 Given the mobility and fungibility of 
intercompany activities this is likely the most significant hurdle on a conceptual level for source 
jurisdictions. Yet, since corporate taxation in general is known to affect investment this does not 
provide a definitive counter-argument.
124
 Indeed, there is strong support in the literature that this 
criticism is less valid in regard to foreign direct investment (‘FDI’)125 compared to portfolio 
investment.
126
 This is particularly important given MNE’s cross-border intercompany flows are 
included within the scope of FDI, despite scepticism from key policymakers that these investments 
are always ‘real’.127 
Accordingly, it would be necessary to either achieve a degree of international coordination,
128
 for 
example, on tax bases and minimum tax rates – or ensure that the tax is levied at sufficiently low rates 
so as not to significantly alter incentives for location. Admittedly, international tax coordination is 
difficult to enforce and sources of rents are unlikely to be very location-specific where activities are 
inherently very mobile.
129
 Nonetheless, the literature does note that it is, in principle, optimal to allow 
capital-importing countries to use source-based taxes as an indirect way of taxing pure economic 
rents.
130
 In any event, the proposal earmarked by this paper only needs to offer a sufficiently improved 
alternative to the current regime – rather than a perfect alternative.131 
 
3.3 TAXING INTERCOMPANY ECONOMIC RENTS 
The following section proposes a method of taxing cross-border intercompany economic rents by 
merging this paper’s two-fold extension of the literature, specifically: first, that all cross-border 
intercompany financial, leasing and licensing activities be treated equally for tax purposes; and 
second, that the framework utilised for this be modelled on economic rent taxation.  
As examined by the Henry Review,
132
 several fundamental reform options exist which would tax 
economic rent, one of which is an ACE. The ACE reform proposal originated in the 1970’s with the 
Meade Committee,
133
 and ACE has since been the subject of an extensive literature. This literature has 
been briefly examined in a paper previously written by the author.
134
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The ACE is one of several fundamental reform options which would, in theory, eliminate the 
distinction between debt and equity in the corporate tax regime. Proposed fundamental reforms 
include, but are not limited to, the ACE, the CBIT, the combined ACE-CBIT and the allowance for 
corporate capital (‘ACC’). These reform options address the debt bias either by disallowing 
deductions for the cost of debt financing, providing deductions for the cost of equity financing, or 
allowing deductions for the cost of both debt and equity financing. Of these fundamental reforms only 
the ACE has been experimented with in practice and even then it has only been conceptualised as a 
domestic-level solution. Nonetheless, the ACE literature contemplates that under an ACE there would 
be no need for rules restricting the deductibility of interest in the cross-border context. 
Previous work by the author presents the possibility of implementing a combined ACE-CBIT in the 
cross-border context as an alternative to thin capitalisation rules.
135
 A combined ACE-CBIT, 
consisting of a partial ACE and a partial CBIT,
136
 mitigates the discrimination between both debt and 
equity financing. First referred to in 2009,
137
 the combined ACE-CBIT has a substantial number of 
advantages; first, it was designed as a revenue neutral policy, and is also independent on whether the 
CORTAX model
138
 is extended to tax havens or discrete location choices.
139
 Further, economic 
analysis shows that moving to the combined ACE-CBIT could potentially bring substantial benefits in 
terms of reducing leverage, reducing systemic risk and reducing profit-shifting,
140
 by bringing the 
amount of interest close to its efficient level.
141
 Finally, empirical estimates suggest that the combined 
ACE-CBIT would raise welfare by 0.3% of GDP due to the more neutral tax treatment of debt and 
equity.
142
 Although relatively new to the literature, there is persuasive empirical evidence suggesting 
that the combined ACE-CBIT would expand welfare due to its more efficient financial structure.
143
 
However, the combined ACE-CBIT has not yet been analysed in detail by the literature;
144
 for 
example, in Australia, recommendations for reform have featured detailed analysis of the ACE, ACC, 
CBIT and DIT – entirely omitting the combined ACE-CBIT.145 The question of whether a cross-
border combined ACE-CBIT would be a viable alternative to thin capitalisation rules remains 
understudied in literature. Further, the ACE literature currently overlooks intercompany issues.  
On the other hand, this paper suggests that since intercompany financing, licensing and leasing 
activities are fungible,
146
 it is arguably more effective and robust to addressing BEPS in this context 
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through a cross-border ACE-CBIT with an equal allowable deduction for both the cost of 
intercompany financial flows in place of existing thin capitalisation rules. 
An unequal tax treatment between these fungible intercompany activities can create distortions, which 
in turn incentivises tax planning behaviour. Accordingly, in the context of cross-border intercompany 
transactions pertaining to activities such as financing, licensing and leasing, the deductibility of all 
expenses could be restricted to a portion of a suitable proxy for the economic rent (or normal rate of 
return; such as the risk-free rate), as illustrated in Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 below.  
Figure 5 
 
Using the last permutation offered in Figure 2 as the base case for Figure 5, it is clear that a restriction 
on the deductibility of cross-border intercompany financing activities limits the extent of 
opportunities available for BEPS in this setting. While the overall tax payable was originally $25, 
under a cross-border ACE-CBIT this increases to $77.5. This exceeds the originating scenario 
illustrated in Figure 2, where overall tax payable was $70. For completeness, despite the neatness of 
this scenario, it is important to recognise that MNE behaviour would likely be responsible to this new 
regulatory framework. This brings to the fore the issues anticipated in previous section 3.2, and is the 
subject of further research by the author. 
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Figure 6 
 
The above Figure 6 reiterates the implications of the fungibility of cross-border financing and 
licensing activities, replicating the outcome of Figure 5. This scenario has assumed that amortisation 
is not applicable. 
Figure 7 
 
Similarly to the above two scenarios, a restriction on the deductibility of cross-border intercompany 
leasing activities limits the extent of opportunities available for BEPS in this setting. While the overall 
tax payable was originally $0, under a cross-border ACE-CBIT this increases to $22.5. This does not 
exceed the originating scenario illustrated in Figure 4, where overall tax payable was $40, but this is 
by virtue of the full amount of the depreciation remaining available to Co. A and Co. B operating at a 
tax loss regardless of whether there is a restriction on its depreciation expense. Despite the neatness of 
this scenario, it is important to recognise that MNE behaviour would likely be responsible to this new 
regulatory framework by possibly shifting depreciation expenses to Co. C rather than Co. B, if 
possible. 
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Regarding the selection of the appropriate ACE-CBIT rate, it is instructive to revisit the ACE 
literature. The ACE literature suggests that the risk-free
147
 interest rate
148
 is the preferred rate for the 
notional return on equity (‘the ACE rate’). Leading commentators agree the best proxy for this is the 
long-term government bond rate.
149
 
However, the use of the long-term government bond rate can result in issues at both the domestic and 
the international levels, which the literature has thus far remained silent on. 
Domestically, the issues are two-fold. First, on a pragmatic level, if a country has a relatively 
fragmented or unstable financial market, there is no obvious choice for a risk-free rate.
150
 
Second, it is arguable that the risk-free rate does not necessarily reflect the actual cost of equity for 
each firm. Sørensen and Johnson observe that, “in practice, the ability of the ACE to eliminate the 
debt bias depends crucially on … whether actual interest rates differ from the notional return chosen 
to relieve equity”.151 This was the rationale for the US Treasury’s critique of the ACE system, which 
commentators such as Rumble highlight when rejecting the viability of the ACE. However, Rumble’s 
observation that “the ACE proposal is a detailed exposition of a dividend deduction scheme”152 
suggests that he has arguably conflated the ACE with dividend deductibility. The degree of non-
neutrality would depend on the size of the difference between the actual and the appropriate rate of 
the notional interest.
153
  Since a substantial amount of information would be required to set the ACE 
rate
154
 this may be overly burdensome administratively, requiring different rates for different 
companies.
155
 Nonetheless, a key counter-argument is that even if the ACE rate were set at the “wrong 
level” this would still be preferable to a zero ACE rate, as effectively provided under the existing 
system. On the other hand, some commentators suggest that the ACE rate could simply equal the 
interest rate paid on debt financing.
156
 
Internationally, particularly when dealing with MNEs, it is questionable that a domestic risk-free rate 
is the best indicator of a MNEs notional return on equity. Rather, a worldwide rate would arguably be 
a more suitable proxy. This has been overlooked in the context of the ACE literature, most likely due 
to the traditionally domestic nature of ACE reform proposals. A “worldwide debt-to-capital ratio 
interest limitation rule” (otherwise known as the “worldwide gearing ratio”) currently exists in both 
the theory and practice of thin capitalisation rules, whereby interest deductions on debt financing are 
denied to the extent that the proportion of a company’s assets exceeds the proportion of the group’s 
worldwide third-party debt to asset ratio.
157
 This rule is inherently suited to international 
harmonization,
158
 which would also be compatible with an ACE system.
159
 
However, as demonstrated in a previous paper written by the author,
160
 it is questionable that an ACE 
equalises the tax treatment of debt and equity financing. Rather, an ACE simply mitigates the debt 
bias. On the other hand, it is arguably more effective to instead align the tax treatment of 
intercompany financial flows to eliminate part of the tax incentive for BEPS-related tax planning 
behaviour. This is particularly timely because in the context of intercompany financing, the OECD is 
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currently considering best practice approaches to designing rules to prevent BEPS using interest.
161
 
However, the OECD makes a distinction between combating BEPS and reducing distortions between 
the tax treatment of debt and equity.
162
 Yet, it is the decision of the revenue authorities to create a tax-
induced debt bias which arguably results in said tax base erosion.
163
 
This paper’s proposal for a tax on intercompany economic rents is a non-distortionary,164 novel 
extension of the literature aligning with the main aim of corporate tax harmonisation.
165
 
 
4 CONCLUSION 
This paper approaches the issue of taxing MNEs from a novel perspective by extending the 
observation in the literature regarding the fungibility of intercompany financing by exploring the 
broader question of conceptualising cross-border intercompany financing, licensing and leasing 
activities as fungible. 
Given the mobility and fungibility of these intercompany activities, this paper explores the lack of 
conceptual basis for the arm’s length principle, observing that this approach is not a second-best 
solution to the issue of BEPS by MNEs. An analysis of the practice, issues in practice and hurdles to 
reform of the arm’s length principle is provided, with a focus on source jurisdictions vulnerable to tax 
base erosion, particularly in the context of a small, open economy where the marginal investor is 
likely to be a foreign investor, such as Australia or New Zealand. There is currently a gap in the 
literature regarding the taxation of economic rent in the small, open economy context. Further, this 
issue extends to all capital importers in general, rendering large capital importers such as the UK
166
 
and Canada
167
 also within scope. 
This paper revisits the literature to highlight that since intercompany activities operate in an 
imperfectly competitive market, the theoretically correct procedure is to tax the marginal cost of 
investment, as would be the case under an economic rent tax. Specifically, this paper examines 
whether it is possible to address commentators’ and policymakers’ growing concerns regarding BEPS 
by adapting an economic rent tax; namely, the combined ACE-CBIT, into the cross-border context to 
improve or replace existing rules governing the taxation of cross-border intercompany activities. 
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